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PARKER V FRANK EMMET REAL ESTATE:
SHOULD PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF
SERVICE OF PROCESS METHOD
MATTER?
The fundamental right to due process of law is afforded to every person
in the United States by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.' Procedural due process has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to require that a defendant be notified of any legal action
brought against him and given the opportunity to be heard through pres-
entation of a defense. 2 The initial requirement of notice is met if the de-
fendant is adequately informed of a legal action, including the nature of
that action.' To that end, the plaintiff provides the defendant with notice
of the commencement of an action in the form of a summons and com-
plaint. The plaintiffs process server serves notice either on the defendant
personally or at the defendant's home.4
To ensure that service of process will be adequate, legislatures have en-
1. U.S. CONSTr. amend. V ("nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
2. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "An elemen-
tary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions." Id. at 314.
3. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method
may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform
those affected. . . or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that
the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of
the feasible and customary substitutes.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982): "[tlhe suffi-
ciency of notice must be tested with reference to its ability to inform people of the pendency
of proceedings that affect their interests."
4. Service of process has been defined as "the giving of such actual or constructive
notice of a suit or other legal proceeding to defendant as makes him a party thereto, and
compels him to appear or suffer judgment by default . 72 C.J.S. Process § 25 (1951).
See Greene, 456 U.S. at 449.
[p]ersonal service guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal action; it thus
presents the ideal circumstance under which to commence legal proceedings
against a person, and has traditionally been deemed necessary in actions styled in
personam. . . . Nevertheless, certain less rigorous notice procedures have enjoyed
substantial acceptance throughout our legal history . ...
Parker v. Frank Emmet Real Estate
acted laws enumerating alternative means of serving process. The differ-
ent methods set forth in each service of process statute depend, in part, on
the nature of the cause of action being asserted. For forcible entry and
detainer cases,5 the District of Columbia Code specifies two methods by
which a landlord may effect service of process on a tenant.6 These include
both actual and constructive service of process. Actual service entails
handing the summons and complaint to the defendant. Constructive serv-
ice entails delivering the summons and complaint to either a tenant in pos-
session of the premises or someone over the age of sixteen in possession of
or residing on the premises, or by posting the summons and complaint in a
conspicuous place on the premises.7 Though the statute itself provides no
indication of the preferred method of service if the defendant cannot be
Id. (citation omitted). Notice will usually be served on the defendant by a special process
server.
5. A cause of action for forcible entry and detainer may be brought by a landlord
against a tenant who maintains possession of the leased premises beyond the time when
possession was to cease. Forcible entry and detainer has been defined as "violently taking or
keeping possession of lands or tenements, by means of threats, force, or arms, and without
authority of law." 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 1 (1961).
6. Service of process in forcible entry and detainer cases may be either actual or
constructive.
Actual service is made by reading the original process to defendant, or by deliver-
ing to him a copy thereof; and constructive service, which is a substituted service, is
made by leaving a copy of the process at defendant's residence when he is absent,
or by posting or publishing notice of the pendency of the suit, and mailing a copy
of the notice posted or published to defendant.
72 C.J.S. Process § 25 (1951) (footnotes omitted). The District of Columbia Code provides
alternative means of serving process if personal service of the defendant cannot be
accomplished.
If the defendant has left the District of Columbia, or cannot be found, the sum-
mons may be served by delivering a copy thereof to the tenant, or by leaving a
copy with some person above the age of sixteen years residing on or in possession
of the premises sought to be recovered, and if no one is in actual possession of the
premises, or residing thereon, by posting a copy of the summons on the premises
where it may be conveniently read.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1502 (1981) (original version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-736 (1940)). In
Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766, 768-69 (D.C. Cir. 1950), the court stated that § 16-1502 of the
District of Columbia Code
can be given a reasonable and consistent construction throughout by reading it to
provide that service shall be (1) on the defendant in person if he has not left the
District of Columbia and can be found, (2) if he has left the District or cannot be
found, by delivering a copy to the tenant or by leaving the same with some person
over sixteen in possession of or residing on the premises, if there is a tenant or such
person and either can be found; (3) if the defendant has left the District or cannot
be found and no one above the age of sixteen can be found in actual possession or
residing on the premises then no one is in "actual possession" or "residing thereon"
and posting is proper.
7. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1502, supra note 6.
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personally served, courts have determined that the means of serving pro-
cess are set forth in the statute in descending order of preference.8
In several landlord-tenant cases, District of Columbia courts have ad-
dressed the adequacy of service of process by posting.9 Posting alone has
been found adequate only after the process server has used due diligence
and made a conscientious effort to use other, more preferred methods of
service.'° District of Columbia courts have generally interpreted due dili-
gence to mean attempting personal or substitute service more than once. If
repeated attempts at personal or substitute service of process fail, service
by posting is an acceptable last resort." The degree of care required of a
landlord's process server was at issue in Parker v. Frank Emmet Real Es-
8. The legislative history of the statute does not indicate if one method of service of
process is preferred over another. See Dewey, 180 F.2d at 768 n.2. Courts, however, have
added a judicial gloss to the statute to clarify which methods of service are preferred. See id
at 768-69; Moody v. Winchester Management Corp., 321 A.2d 562, 564 (D.C. 1974).
9. E.g., Dewey, 180 F.2d at 767-68 (where the marshall tried on three consecutive days
to serve and no one was at home, service by posting was valid); Westmoreland v. Weaver
Bros., Inc., 295 A.2d 506 (D.C. 1972) (service by posting does not violate due process in
landlord-tenant cases where the tenant wants to retain possession because the tenant can
probably be found on the premises and is very likely to get notice); Gordan v. William J.
Davis, Inc., 270 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1970) (where a process server claimed to have twice gone to
defendant's home to serve process, but defendant's wife denied hearing a knock the second
time, and defendant was then served by posting, service was valid because it provided timely
notice); Etelson v. Andre, 61 A.2d 806 (D.C. 1948) (a maid refused to accept process and the
marshall tacked notice on front door; because process was left available after the maid's
refusal, service was valid); Lynch v. Bernstein, 48 A.2d 467 (D.C. 1946) (where a process
server went twice to a defendant's home and, on the second visit, while the process server
was tacking the notice on the door, a woman came to the door and a discussion ensued, and
tacking was then completed, service was valid because defendant received timely notice);
Shannon & Luchs Co. v. Jones, L & T (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1981) (No. 56508-81), 109
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2501 (Dec. 8, 1981) (service is not valid where the process server at-
tempted service of process on nine defendants only once prior to posting notice and eight out
of the nine times someone who could have received service was at home and did not hear
the process server's knock).
10. "[T]he validity of service by posting depends on the process server first making a
diligent and conscientious attempt to effect personal or substituted service." Westmoreland,
295 A.2d at 509. Also, in Shannon & Luchs, the court stated that "the judicially construed
requirement of diligence, was designed to prevent the commencement of actions for posses-
sion where . . . further efforts on the part of the process server could have avoided utiliza-
tion of the least preferred method of effecting service of process." Shannon & Luchs, 109
Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2506. The District of Columbia courts are not the only courts that
have had to set the standard for what constitutes due diligence. An article in the Wisconsin
Bar Bulletin states clearly that Wisconsin courts have also had to define due diligence
through case law. See Ware, Service of Process: Establishing Reasonable Diligence, 54 Wis.
B. BULL. 13 (1981).
11. "The term 'post,' when used with reference to a notice, means '... to nail, attach,
affix or otherwise fasten up physically and to display in a conspicuous manner .... "
Moody, 321 A.2d at 564 (quoting Epp v. Bowman-Biltmore Hotels Corp., 171 Misc. 338,
342, 12 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (1939)).
[Vol. 32:974
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tale,'2 a forcible entry and detainer case recently decided by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In Dewey v. Clark, 3 a deputy marshall tried on three consecutive days
to serve the defendant at his home. On each occasion, the marshall, after
knocking on the door, found neither the defendant nor any other person of
the requisite age on the premises. After failing on the third day to elicit
any response, the marshall securely fastened two copies of the summons
and complaint to the apartment door. Noting the three attempts to serve
the defendant either personally or constructively through someone in pos-
session of the premises, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that service by posting was valid under the
circumstances. "
In Etelson v. Andre,15 a deputy marshall made two visits to the defend-
ant's home to attempt service of process. Finding no one at home on his
initial visit, the marshall returned two and one half hours later, at which
time a maid answered the door. Upon inquiry, the maid stated that the
defendant was not at home and that she was under orders to accept papers
from no one. Thereafter, the marshall tacked the summons and complaint
to the door of the premises. The District of Columbia Municipal Court of
Appeals held that the marshall's actions constituted due diligence and,
therefore, service of process by posting was valid.' 6
Recently, in Shannon & Luchs Co. v. Jones,17 plaintiff's special process
server attempted service on nine defendants. In each case, the process
server knocked on the front door and, after waiting approximately one
minute, proceeded to tack the complaint to the door.' 8 Eight of the nine
defendants served claimed to have been at home at the time of attempted
service and to have heard no knock. Though all nine defendants received
timely notice, the District of Columbia Superior Court found that the pro-
cess server had failed to make a diligent and conscientious effort to serve
the defendants personally.' 9 The court held that where diligence on the
12. 451 A.2d 62 (D.C. 1982).
13. 180 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
14. Id. at 768-69.
15. 61 A.2d 806 (D.C. 1948).
16. Id. at 807-08.
17. L & T (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1981) (No. 56508-81), 109 Daily Wash. L. Rep.
2501 (Dec. 8, 1981).
18. Id. at 2501.
19. Id. at 2506. "[Tlhis Court concludes that the process server's perfunctory efforts
failed to comply with the requirement that diligent and conscientious attempts be made to
effect personal or substitute service before resorting to posting, as mandated by § 16-1502."
19831
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part of the process server could have resulted in personal or substitute
service, posting was inadequate.2°
In Gordan v. William J Davis, Inc. ,2 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reached a somewhat different result. In Gordan, the landlord's
process server claimed to have attempted twice to serve process on the de-
fendant. The first time, he knocked on the door of the premises and re-
ceived no answer. He left the premises, returned later the same day and
again received no answer to his knock. He proceeded to tack the summons
and complaint to the front door of the defendant's abode. The defendant's
wife took issue with the process server's recital of the facts, claiming that
she had been at home the entire day, heard no knock and saw the process
server merely tack a copy of the summons and complaint to the front door
of the premises. Though there was some dispute as to the facts, the court
found service of process to be valid. The court reasoned that the defend-
ant had received the summons and complaint in a timely fashion, had
knowledge of the suit against him, and was able to file a timely answer.
22
District of Columbia courts have attempted to set a standard for deter-
mining when posting is an adequate method of service process. Attempt-
ing personal or substitute service two or three times prior to posting has
consistently been held to constitute due diligence on the part of the process
server. 23 On one occasion, however, an attempt to serve process in this
manner has not been sustained. In the 1982 opinion in Parker v. Frank
20. Id "This Court believes that the judicially construed requirement of diligence, was
designed to prevent the commencement of actions for possession where, as apparently in this
case, further efforts on the part of the process server could have avoided utilization of the
least preferred method of effecting service of process." Id This view is, however, effective
only in hindsight. The court is able to determine whether the proper method of serving
process was used only after the defendant has appeared in court to protest. If the defendant
makes a timely appearance then the reason for the statute, "to provide the means for sum-
moning defendants who have absented themselves from the District," has been fulfilled and
the defendant has no right to protest the method of service on due process grounds. Dewey,
180 F.2d at 768 n.2 (quoting 89 CONG. REC. 1162 (1888) (statement of Mr. Hemphill)). If,
on the other hand, the defendant fails to make a timely appearance, he will suffer a default
judgment. Only then should the defendant be allowed to protest the method of service.
Opponents of this proposal may argue that if courts espouse this view, a defendant who
wishes to protest the method of service, though he received timely notice to make appear-
ance in court, may willingly suffer a default judgment in order to preserve his right to protest
the method of service at a later date. On the surface this seems to be a valid argument.
Most defendants, however, who receive service of process by posting will not know until
they appear in court whether posting was accomplished on the process server's first, second,
or third visit. This ensures that a defendant who receives process in time to appear in court
will be unable to avoid suit.
21. 270 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1970).
22. Id. at 141.
23. See Dewey, 180 F.2d at 766 (three attempts at service on three consecutive days
[Vol. 32:974
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Emmet Real Estate ,24 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals contin-
ued to apply this standard to determine what constitutes due diligence in a
case of service by posting.
In Parker, the landlord, Frank Emmet Real Estate, proceeded against a
tenant, Ross Parker, for nonpayment of rent. Proceedings were begun on
June 18, 1981, at which time a summons and complaint was served on
Parker. Upon visiting Parker's home once and finding no one at home, the
landlord's process server posted a copy of the summons and complaint on
the apartment door. Parker subsequently received the posted notice, made
a timely appearance in court, and moved to dismiss the case for insuffi-
ciency of service of process. The motion was denied by the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia,25 and Parker appealed. After examining ex-
isting law for guidance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted
the factual dissimilarities between the Dewey and Etelson cases, and the
Parker case.26 In Dewey and Etelson, personal or substitute service of
process has been attempted more than once prior to posting. In Parker,
personal service has been attempted only once. The court emphasized the
factual similarities between Parker and Shannon & Luchs as justification
for its view that one visit does not constitute a diligent and conscientious
effort.27 As for Gordan, the court stated that timely receipt of process will
not cure defective service, but will merely be further evidence of proper
28service.
By once again holding that service of process by posting on the first visit
does not constitute due diligence, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals is reaffirming a line of demarcation. The Parker decision is a contin-
uation of the court's efforts to provide a practical interpretation of the
service of process statute. It is an attempt both to ensure a defendant's
constitutional right to due process of law29 and to set forth guidelines for
process servers to follow so that a plaintiffs right to prompt adjudication
constitutes due diligence); Etelson, 61 A.2d at 807-08 (two attempts to serve a defendant,
made two and one half hours apart, constitutes due diligence).
24. 451 A.2d 62 (D.C. 1982).
25. Id. at 63.
26. For a discussion of Dewey and Etelson, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying
text.
27. See Parker, 451 A.2d at 65. For a discussion of Shannon & Luchs, see supra notes
17-20 and accompanying text. Both Parker and Shannon & Luchs involve process servers
who made one visit to the defendant's residence, waited a short time for a response to a
knock on the door, and then posted process on the door of the premises.
28. Parker, 451 A.2d at 66.
29. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
right to due process of law.
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of claims will be realized.3" In addition, the articulation of well-defined
guidelines will aid courts in determining the validity of service of process,
thereby reducing the amount of time courts must spend hearing debates on
that issue.
Though these goals are laudable, there is danger that the process will
become so streamlined and mechanical that the rights of one of the parties
will be compromised in the name of efficiency. Because many variables
have to be taken into account, the question of the validity of service of
process does not lend itself to application of a rigid formula. As noted
above, the purpose of service of process is to give a defendant notice of the
action being asserted against him and time to prepare a defense.3
Whether or not this purpose is attained does not depend on the number of
times service is attempted, but rather on whether notice is timely received
by the defendant. By setting a numerical cut-off point, the Parker court
has ignored the factual similarities between Gordan and Parker,3 2 the fac-
tual differences between Shannon & Luchs and Parker,33 and the possibil-
ity of situations in which even stringent requirements of due diligence
might fail to ensure a defendant's due process rights.
Relying on Gordan, the landlord argued that Parker's actual receipt of
notice and timely appearance in court cured any defect in service of pro-
cess.34 Though the Parker court acknowledged the Gordan court's consid-
eration of the defendant's actual, timely receipt of process,35 it refused to
view actual receipt as curing inadequate service of process. Rather, it
viewed receipt only as further evidence of valid service.36 By limiting the
Gordan holding, the Parker court has ignored the factual similarity be-
tween the two cases. In Parker, the special process server attempted serv-
ice only once. In Gordan, if the special process server failed to knock prior
to posting during the second visit, as contended by the defendant's wife,
then personal or substitute service was attempted only once prior to post-
ing. Furthermore, the defendants in both cases received timely notice. By
30. Parker, 451 A.2d at 64.
31. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
32. Both Parker and Gordan arguably are cases in which service was attempted only
once. Assuming that defendant's wife's story in Gordan was true, then service was attempted
only once. Gordan, 270 A.2d at 141. In addition, defendants in both cases received timely
notice of the suits against them and appeared in court to present a defense.
33. In Shannon & Luchs, eight of the nine defendants served were at home at the time
process was posted. This is not the case in Parker. Such a factual dissimilarity is significant
in service of process cases where courts stress personal service of the defendant and find it
overwhelmingly the preferred method.
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emphasizing the number of times the process server visited the defendant's
home, rather than the defendant's actual receipt of notice, the court may
be undermining the substance of the due process requirement while embel-
lishing the judicial gloss placed on the statute. The reason for requiring
service of process is to provide notice to defendants. 37 The logical conclu-
sion, therefore, is that service is valid, regardless of the number of times
attempted, if the defendant is actually notified in a timely fashion by any
one of the means prescribed by the statute.38 Such a conclusion is consis-
37. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fundamental due
process right to notice.
38. The statute itself, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1502 (1973) (current version at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1502 (1981)), merely sets forth the different means by which service may be made.
See supra note 6. Though the statute has been judicially interpreted as listing methods of
service of process in order of preference, the statutory language does not specify that one
means must be exhausted before others are attempted. Courts have determined that a pro-
cess server must first attempt personal service on the defendant. If that fails, then the pro-
cess server must attempt substitute service. Only then, when both personal and the more
preferred methods of substitute service have failed, may the process server resort to posting
notice. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
In contrast to the judicially issued summons and complaint in a forcible entry and de-
tainer case, a notice to quit is "simply a notice given privately from one party to another,
terminating (or attempting to terminate) the landlord-tenant relationship." Craig v. Heil, 47
A.2d 871, 872 (D.C. 1946). The statute governing service of a notice to quit states that:
Every notice to the tenant to quit shall be served upon him personally, if he can
be found, and if he can not be found it shall be sufficient service of said notice to
deliver the same to some person of proper age upon the premises, and in the ab-
sence of such tenant or person to post the same in some conspicuous place upon the
leased premises.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-906 (1973) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1981)).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has found actual receipt of a notice to quit
sufficient to justify the means of service. In Craig, where a landlord served a notice to quit
on a tenant by registered mail, the court held that because notice was put into the tenant's
hands by the postman in conformance with personal service specified by statute, service was
valid. Craig, 47 A.2d at 872-73. The Craig court stated that
[ilt is not so much that we approve the method as that we give effect to the result
attained. We emphasize that 'served upon him personally' as used in the statute
means just that, and that any method which accomplishes less than that will not
satisfy the requirement of personal service.
Craig, 47 A.2d at 873. In Lynch v. Bernstein, 48 A.2d 467 (D.C. 1946), where a landlord
served a notice to quit on a tenant on the second visit made to the tenant's domicile, the
court based its finding of adequate notice on the tenant's actual receipt of notice and compli-
ance with the terms of D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1605(b)(3) (1940) (current version at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 45-906 (1981)). In its holding, the Lynch court stated that "lw]e are not to be
understood as holding that receipt of notice constitutes a waiver of the requirements of the
statute for substituted service. Such receipt, however, shows that the purpose of the statute
was accomplished." Lynch, 48 A.2d at 468.
In contrast to Lynch and Craig, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Jones v.
Brawner Co., 435 A.2d 54 (D.C. 1981), found service to be invalid where a landlord served a
tenant notice to quit by slipping it under the tenant's door. Similarly, service was found to
be invalid in Moody v. Winchester Management Corp., 321 A.2d 562 (D.C. 1974), where a
19831
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tent with the language as well as the purpose of the service statute.
While focusing on the factual similarities between Parker and Shannon
& Luchs, the Parker court ignored the factual dissimilarities. In Shannon
& Luchs, eight of the nine defendants served by the process server were at
home at the time the process server claimed to have attempted service, yet
they heard no knock.39 The logical conclusion is that the process server
could have personally served eight of the nine defendants. Moreover, if
the server had been diligent in attempting service of the defendants, there
would have been no need to resort to the least preferred method of service.
Relying on these facts, the court found service by posting to be invalid. In
contrast, there is no evidence in Parker that the defendant was at home
when service was attempted, or that further attempts at personal or substi-
tute service would have resulted in any method of service other than post-
ing. This factual distinction raises the question of whether the Shannon &
Luchs decision was properly applied by the Parker court. Because of the
factual similarities between Parker and Gordan, it would have been more
appropriate for the Parker court to have applied the Gordan rationale. Us-
ing Gordan as precedent, the Parker court could have underscored the fact
that the defendant actually received the summons and complaint in a
landlord's agent served notice to quit on a tenant by placing the notice in an envelope and
slipping it under the tenant's door. Thus, in notice to quit cases, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals requires that service be made by some method specified in the service of
process statute. It does not, however, require that personal service be attempted before
resorting to substitute service or that personal and substitute service be attempted before
resorting to posting. If service is made by some statutory method, then actual receipt of
notice by the defendant results in valid service of process.
An analogy may be made between service of process in a forcible entry and detainer case
and service of a notice to quit. Both statutes specify the same alternative methods of com-
pleting service of process. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1502 (1981) (original version at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-736 (1940); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-906 (1973) (current version at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1981)). The difference between the statutes is the interpretation
given them by the District of Columbia courts. Whereas the court in a forcible entry and
detainer case will require exhaustion of the more preferred methods of serving process prior
to the posting of notice, the court in a notice to quit case will uphold service if made by any
method specified by statute so long as the defendant receives notice in a timely fashion. The
court's reliance on the defendant's actual receipt of notice in a notice to quit case complies
with the rationale underlying the notice requirement in any cause of action-that the de-
fendant be made aware of a pending or potential suit against him. Though the court's ra-
tionale for treating service of process and notice to quit cases differently may be based on the
fact that the former is issued by a court and the the latter by a landlord, there is great
similarity between the two processes. Because of their similarity, it would be logical for the
District of Columbia courts to apply the statutes in a comparable manner. Therefore, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals could justify applying the same service of process
rule used in notice to quit cases to forcible entry and detainer cases.
39. Shannon & Luchs, 109 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2506.
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timely manner and placed less emphasis on the actual means of service.4°
Reliance on Gordan would have fulfilled the purpose of service of process:
notifying the defendant of the cause of action.
The court's holding in Parker is also flawed in hypothetical application.
It is conceivable that a special process server might make two visits to the
defendant's home only minutes apart on the same day. Under the court's
rigid formula, service by posting on the first visit would be invalid, while
on the second visit posting would constitute valid service. Because of the
proximity of time, however, the second attempt at service probably would
be no more likely to end in personal or substitute service than the first
attempt. This hypothetical illustrates the problems inherent in applying a
purely numerical standard to determine the validity of service of process.
Indeed, reaffirmance of such a structured formula illustrates a lack of fore-
sight on the part of the court.
Though it is questionable whether the number of times service has been
attempted should be the sole determinant of due diligence, use of the de-
fendant's timely receipt of process as the standard may also have its draw-
backs. A timely receipt standard might encourage a defendant not to
appear in court or file an answer even when timely notice of suit had been
received. Upon the defendant's failure to file an answer, the presumption
might arise that the plaintiff had failed to use due diligence in delivering
service of process, though the plaintiff may have attempted service several
times.
The District of Columbia courts should implement a more effective rule.
For example, a defendant's timely appearance in court could be viewed as
conclusive evidence of valid service of process, whereas a defendant's fail-
ure to make a timely appearance could alert the court to examine the
method of service used and the number of times service was attempted.
This rule would achieve the objectives sought by the District of Columbia
courts: prompt adjudication of plaintiffs' claims and preservation of de-
fendants' due process rights.
Whatever standard the District of Columbia courts ultimately choose to
govern service of process cases, the Parker court clearly had justification to
hold service by posting valid. The defendant in Parker was afforded the
constitutional process due him. In addition, approval of this method
would have been consistent with the language and purpose of the District
of Columbia statute. The statute expressly allows service of process to be
40. See Westmoreland, 295 A.2d 506 (service by posting in a landlord-tenant case does
not violate due process where the tenant wishes to stay on premises, because the tenant is
easily accessible).
19831
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completed by posting. Service accomplished by posting should be found
valid regardless of other available methods when the means actually used
reach the end desired.
M. Meredith Hayes
